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1 Introduction
Concern about rising income inequality in rich countries has become a common
theme among commentators, politicians and international organisations, often fo-
cusing on the increased share going to the top versus the “squeezed middle”. Polari-
sation of the wage distribution from hollowing out of the occupational structure has
received a great deal of attention. Polarisation in the broader income distribution
in terms of a shrinking share of households “in the middle” has also been studied,
as has the extent to which the share of total income going to households around
the middle has been falling (Wolfson, 1997; Deutsch & Silber, 2010). Polarisa-
tion or declining income shares for the middle could go together with rising living
standards, but rising inequality is seen by some to be a key cause of stagnating
real incomes and living standards for the middle and lower parts of the distribu-
tion (Mishel et al., 2012; Stiglitz, 2012; Chakravarty & D’Ambrosio, 2010). This
linkage is at the core of the recent focus on “inclusive growth” and “shared pros-
perity”, which has become a rallying-cry and central focus for the OECD and other
multilateral organisations (Saunders, 2001; de Mello & Dutz, 2012; OECD, 2015;
World Bank, 2016).
This paper investigates the extent to which increasing income inequality has in
fact been associated with stagnating middle incomes from around 1980 through the
Great Recession. Drawing on data across 31 rich countries from the Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS), the OECD Income Distribution Database (OECD) and the
World Inequality Database (WID), we examine how income inequality and median
household incomes have evolved over time and the extent to which rising inequality
is associated with changes in median incomes. The experience of the United States
over the past 30 years – rapid rise in income inequality together with slow growth of
middle incomes – has played a major role in influencing research and commentary
on inequality, living standards and the “squeezed middle”. Here we put that expe-
rience in comparative context. The paper also brings out some important lessons
about using the available data to analyse the relationship between inequality and
living standards and how best to track and monitor “inclusive growth”.
We begin in Section 2 with a discussion of the channels through which inequal-
ity might affect middle incomes. Section 3 describes the data we use. Sections 4
and 5 look at trends in middle incomes and in income inequality, respectively. In
Section 6 we investigate the extent to which rising income inequality is associated
with stagnating middle incomes. Section 7 highlights our key findings and priori-
ties for further analysis.
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2 Inequality and the “squeezed middle”
The notion that the middle has been squeezed could refer to a shrinking proportion
being located around the middle, which is what polarisation is usually taken to
mean, or to those around the middle losing out in terms of their share in total
income. Each of these has been the focus of recent research in economics and
sociology, including the classic study by C. Wright Mills (Mills 1956; Ehrenreich,
1989; Alderson et al., 2005; Goos & Manning, 2007; Goos et al., 2009; Foster &
Wolfson, 2010; D’Ambrosio, 2001; Bigot et al., 2011; Alderson & Doran, 2013;
Atkinson & Brandolini, 2013; Autor & Dorn, 2013; Lazonick, 2014).
In popular and political debate, the dominant concern is that the middle has
seen little or no improvement in living standards and overall prosperity over time.
While this concern includes greater insecurity and vulnerability for the middle as
well as diminished opportunities and prospects for their children (Nichols & Rehm,
2014; Hacker at al., 2014), stagnating real incomes is central to the debate, partic-
ularly in the USA.
Why would rising income inequality reduce the growth of middle incomes?
One hypothesis suggests a direct effect: if those in the upper-middle or at the top
receive an increasing share of total income, there must be a compensating decline
in shares elsewhere (see also Nolan & Thewissen, forthcoming).
A second hypothesis proposes an indirect effect: economic growth is a key
source of real income growth for households in the middle and lower parts of the
income distribution, and rising income inequality reduces economic growth (see
also Thewissen, 2014). For many years the prevailing wisdom held that higher
inequality provides the incentives required to drive economic growth. Recently,
though, Joseph Stiglitz (2012; 2015), IMF and OECD studies (Ostry et al., 2014;
Cingano, 2014; OECD, 2015), and some prominent financial sector commentaries
(Morgan, 2015; Standard & Poor’s, 2014), among others, have suggested that rising
income inequality may instead be damaging to growth. There are several channels
through which inequality might reduce economic growth. First, inequality might
reinforce barriers to socio-economic mobility, so more people fail to reach their
full productive potential. Second, there are channels related to investment in hu-
man, physical, and financial capital and reducing aggregate demand, such as the
reduction of the capacity of middle and lower income households to invest in ed-
ucation and skills; the undermining of capital investment; fuelling household debt
and real estate bubbles; and increasing barriers to entry and stifling innovation. A
third set of channels relates to attitudinal changes, trust, and power: inequality may
exacerbate pressures for protectionism and restriction of immigration, undermine
political and legal institutions, reduce social trust, and entrench the power of exist-
ing elites to protect their economic interests, including rent-seeking.
Our aim is to describe and assess overall trends and patterns in income inequal-
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ity and middle incomes in OECD countries and probe the extent to which they are
related. While this can only be suggestive as to underlying causal mechanisms and
relationships, such an analysis does allow us to consider which of the competing
grand narratives that are central in current debates – that inequality contributes to
rising prosperity for "ordinary" middle-income households or hinders it – is more
consistent with the evidence from varying country experiences.
3 Data
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database and the OECD Income Distribution
Database provide standardized income data across countries and time (Atkinson et
al., 1995; OECD, 2008; 2011; 2012; 2015; Gornick & Jäntti, 2013; Ravallion,
2015; Gasparini & Tornarolli, 2015). LIS has assembled data for most of the coun-
tries at approximately 5-year intervals beginning around 1980. The OECD database
also presents 5-year interval data for the earlier period and contains a good deal of
annual data for recent years. LIS allows one to go back to around 1980 for more
countries than the OECD database, but the latter has information on New Zealand
and Portugal which are not in LIS, as well as Japan for which LIS has data for only
one year.
Our aim is to capture trends over the medium term, covering recent decades
up to and through the economic crisis. We begin in 1980, as neither database has
many observations before then.1 Most comparative studies use one or the other
of these data sources, but we select from both to cover the longest possible period
for each country. This means we mostly employ data from LIS, but use data from
the OECD database for eight countries.2 While we go back as close to 1980 as
possible, for quite a few countries we have to start later.3 However, in the sample
for our main regressions, we use a more consistent time frame for a more restricted
set of countries because of limited data availability on top incomes.4 We exclude
countries that are in the LIS database but are not OECD members and countries that
are OECD members but generally categorised as middle-income (Chile, Mexico,
and Turkey).
Our central measure for living standards is equivalised disposable household
income. The concept of disposable household income employed in the LIS and
OECD databases is in principle the same, as are the components in terms of earn-
ings, self-employment, capital income, and taxes and transfers, though there may
be subtle differences in operationalization across countries or over time.5 We di-
vide income by the square root of household size to take differences in household
size and composition into account (Buhmann et al., 1988).
To capture trends in real incomes for the middle, we focus on how the me-
dian household income has evolved over time. We use national consumer price
indices (CPI) and purchasing power parities (PPP) for actual individual consump-
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tion, both sourced from OECD National Accounts, to convert all income to 2011
PPP-adjusted dollars.6
We use two indicators of income inequality. The first is the most widely
used summary measure, the Gini coefficient. The Gini is particularly sensitive
to changes in the middle of the income distribution, which fits with our interest in
the income of the middle. The Gini can be calculated from the micro-data in LIS
and is among the measures included in the OECD Income Distribution Database.7
Our second inequality indicator is the income share going to the top 1%. The
household surveys on which both the LIS and OECD databases rely have difficulty
capturing what is happening at the very top of the income distribution, so we draw
on the World Inequality Database, which uses data from the administration of in-
come taxes together with the national accounts (see e.g. Atkinson & Piketty, 2007;
2010; Atkinson et al., 2011; Alvaredo et al., 2013; Piketty, 2014). The top 1%
share data are only available for some OECD countries. They refer to the share of
the top in taxable (before income tax and social insurance contributions) rather than
disposable income and to the tax unit rather than the household (see also Jenkins,
2017).8 While these are important limitations for our purposes, it is essential to
capture what has been happening at the very top of the distribution in some form.
We also examine the association between median income and economic growth
(for a further reflection see Nolan et al., 2018). Economic growth is measured
using gross national income (GNI) per capita, taken from the OECD Systems of
National Accounts database, where it is deflated using the GDP deflator and ex-
pressed in 2011 PPP-adjusted dollars. Unlike gross domestic product (GDP), GNI
excludes primary incomes payable to non-resident units but includes primary in-
comes receivable by residents from non-residents, which is more appropriate as the
household surveys measuring median income include only residents.
4 Trends in living standards at the middle
Figure 1 shows the evolution of real median household incomes for the countries
where we have data going back as far as about 1980 (the evolution in those coun-
tries not included in this figure is shown in the Appendix in Figure A1). We see
considerable variation. In Norway, the median income more than doubled over the
entire period (+125%), while at the other extreme the USA median income almost
entirely stagnated (+12%), with the result that Norway’s median had risen above the
US figure by 2010. Spain too had a rapidly rising median income (+65%); it soared
during 1980-2007 but then fell back between 2007-2013 to below its 2004 level.
The median income in Australia (+42%) was essentially stagnant between 1981-
2003 and then shot up during the commodity boom, whereas in the UK (+69%) it
increased substantially between 1986-2006. Canada (+20%), France (+31%), and
the Netherlands (+32%; see also Salverda & Thewissen, 2018) saw much more
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modest growth for the middle, with substantial periods of stagnation.
Figure 1: Evolution of living standards of the middle: Real median household income from
around 1980 (in 2011 PPP-adjusted dollars)
Note: LIS and OECD (Netherlands, Canada)
There also is considerable variation in how middle incomes evolved among
countries where our earliest observation is the mid/late 1980s. Ireland achieved
more than a doubling of its median household income over the course of 25 years
(+106%), and the median also grew noticeably in Luxembourg (+80%), Sweden
(+69%), and Belgium (+52%). Denmark (+18%) and Germany (+14%) did worse,
the median income was stagnant in Japan over the full period (+0%). Middle in-
comes in Italy and Greece rose at first, but the Great Recession had detrimental
impacts, leading to a small aggregate rise for Italy (+9%) and a decrease (-14%) for
Greece.
Countries experiencing the upheaval of the post-communist transition, for which
our first observation is mostly 1990 or later (often much later), also display striking
differences. Hungary, for example, had a sharp initial decline in median income,
and the subsequent recovery was not sufficient to bring the median back to its 1991
level (-4%). Poland also saw a sharp initial decline, but the subsequent growth, es-
pecially from the mid-2000s, was strong enough to produce a substantial increase
over the whole period (+33%).
To account for the differences in time span, we express growth rates in com-
pound annual growth rates (CAGRs). At one end of the spectrum, Estonia, Ireland,
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Norway, Czech Republic, and Luxembourg had average annual median income
growth of 2% or more. Belgium, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and the UK are
among the countries with average growth of around 1.5%. A substantial cluster of
countries saw average growth that was slower but still at least 0.5%. At the low
end, Germany, Italy, Japan and the USA had annual median income growth under
0.5%. Hungary, Portugal, and Greece had negative growth.
In most countries median household income growth also varied substantially
from one sub-period to another, as Figure 1 illustrates. This provides another source
of variation in assessing how trends in real income for the middle may be related to
trends in income inequality, though the time lags one might expect to operate are
far from clear.
Of course, countries also varied greatly in their median income at the beginning
of the observation period. Some had already achieved high levels of income, while
others started from low levels and had ample scope to catch up, as Figure 1 also
illustrates. This affects to some extent one’s perspective on how well or badly
specific countries have done, but the USA’s performance remains particularly poor.
5 Trends in income inequality
Figure 2 shows what happened to the Gini coefficient over time for the countries for
which we have data beginning around 1980 (the change in countries not included in
this figure is shown in the Appendix in Figure A3). Inequality has risen a good deal
in some nations, but in others it has not risen much, or indeed has fallen. Coun-
tries with a pronounced increase in inequality include the USA and the UK, about
which there has been much research and commentary, but also Australia. Inequal-
ity also went up by more than 3 Gini points in Canada. The rise in inequality was
more modest in the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain, while inequality decreased in
France.
Among countries for which we have data from around 1985 onwards, the Gini
coefficient rose by more than 8 Gini points in Sweden and by more than 5 Gini
points in Slovak Republic, Poland, Israel, New Zealand, and Finland. In other
countries, the Gini did not rise much or even, as in Ireland, decreased. So while
inequality has increased in a clear majority, there is no uniform trend: country
experiences vary widely.
Figure 3 shows the share of total (gross) income going to the top 1% around
1980 and the most recent year available (the evolution in those countries not in-
cluded in this figure is shown in the Appendix in Figure A2). The share going to
the top has generally gone up over this period, but by a great deal more in some
countries than in others. Atkinson and Piketty (2007) highlighted the fact that the
English-speaking countries saw much larger increases than the continental Euro-
pean countries for which estimates were available. Indeed, Australia (+4.2 ppt),
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Figure 2: Long-term trends in the Gini coefficient)
Note: LIS and OECD (Netherlands, Canada)
Canada (+4.7 ppt), Ireland (+5.5 ppt), the UK (+8.6 ppt), and the USA (+8.3 ppt)
all saw this share rise by 4 percentage points or more. Sweden (+4.3 ppt), Fin-
land (+3.2 ppt), and Germany (+3.0 ppt) saw a lower but still substantial increase
of 3 percentage points or more. The top 1%’s share did not increase by much in
Switzerland (+0.2 ppt), the Netherlands (+0.3 ppt), or Spain (+0.6 ppt), though no
country experienced a decrease in the top share over time.
Most of the English-speaking countries where top income shares rose partic-
ularly rapidly (namely Australia, Canada, the UK and the USA) also saw overall
inequality rise markedly. Ireland is an exception: the share of the top 1% increased
sharply but overall inequality declined. Also in Finland and Sweden, top income
shares as well as the Gini coefficient went up noticeably. So there is some con-
sistency in terms of trends between the two indicators of inequality, but also some
substantial divergence: the two measures are positively but only weakly associated
(for the full sample a correlation of 0.57 in levels, but 0.15 in average annual growth
rates). This may arise for a variety of reasons: changes at the top may be missed
Rising Income Inequality and Living Standards in OECD Countries: How
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Figure 3: Long-term trends in top income shares
Note: WID
in household surveys to a varying extent across countries and the Gini measure is
in any case more sensitive to changes occurring around the middle than at either
extreme of the distribution, so the Gini may mostly reflect inequality within the
“bottom 99%”. The differences in income concept and recipient unit already noted
may also be important and merit investigation. For our current purposes, though,
each indicator contains valuable information about what has been happening to
inequality.
6 Are changes in income inequality associated with changes in living
standards?
Have countries with rapidly rising inequality tended to have stagnant real incomes
around the middle? Table 1 ranks nations by their compound annual median house-
hold income growth, splitting the sample into those for which we have top 1% in-
come share information and those for which we have not, and brings that together
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with the annual average change in the Gini and in the top 1% share, each calcu-
lated over the longest period available in LIS for the same years for each country
individually. The rankings by inequality change do not align closely with that by
median income growth (see also Kenworthy, 2013).
Table 1: Evolution of ordinary living standards and inequality
Country First Last Average annual change Average annual Gini Average top 1%
year year in median in % change in Gini points share change in ppt
Ireland 1987 2007 4.52 -0.13 0.28
Norway 1979 2010 2.38 0.08 0.09
Spain 1985 2010 2.29 0.09 0.02
Sweden 1983 2013 1.76 0.28 0.14
South Korea 2006 2012 1.62 0.02 0.24
United Kingdom 1979 2013 1.56 0.2 0.25
Finland 1987 2007 1.51 0.3 0.16
Australia 1981 2010 1.21 0.18 0.14
Switzerland 2000 2010 1.15 0.13 0.02
Italy 1986 2008 1.05 0.1 0.11
Denmark 1987 2010 0.86 -0.01 0.05
France 1978 2010 0.85 -0.08 0.05
New Zealand 1985 2012 0.79 0.23 0.13
Netherlands 1977 2012 0.66 0.05 0.01
Canada 1980 2010 0.53 0.1 0.16
Germany 1984 2010 0.52 0.08 0.12
United States 1979 2013 0.32 0.21 0.25
Japan 1985 2009 0.06 0.13 0.08
Portugal 2004 2005 -0.41 -0.54 0.15
Estonia 2000 2013 5.72 -0.08
Czech Republic 1992 2013 2.3 0.25
Luxembourg 1985 2013 2.13 0.17
Slovak Republic 1992 2013 1.8 0.38
Israel 1986 2012 1.71 0.24
Slovenia 1997 2012 1.63 0.28
Belgium 1985 2013 1.51 0.12
Poland 1992 2013 1.36 0.28
Austria 1994 2013 0.77 -0.01
Iceland 2004 2010 -0.18 -0.19
Hungary 1991 2012 -0.22 0.02
Greece 1986 2013 -0.55 -0.03
Note: LIS, OECD and WID.
The UK and the USA provide a striking illustration of how countries that look
similar in one of these dimensions performed very differently in the other. As the
bottom part of Figure 4 shows, from around 1980 to 2013 the Gini increased by a
comparable amount in the two countries, and both saw a rapid increase in the top
1% income share. Yet the top part of the figure shows that growth in the median
(and in incomes below the median) was much more substantial in the UK.
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Figure 4: Trends in income inequality and growth of real disposable household income by
decile in the US and the UK
Note: LIS and WID
In addition to overall changes over the entire period covered for each coun-
try, we can look at the relationship between median income growth and inequality
employing all the available observations for intervening years. We then find that
median income growth is negatively correlated with change in the Gini (-0.21) but
positively correlated with growth in top income shares (+0.15).
To assess more fully whether the evolution in median household income is
associated with changes in income inequality, we estimate a simple OLS regression
with growth in median household income as the dependent variable and change in
the Gini and the top 1% share entered separately and then together as independent
variables.9 Country fixed effects are removed as the variables are expressed in
growth rates (compound annual growth rate (CAGRs) for median income and GNI
per capita, and average annual percentage point changes for the inequality scalars
which are already expressed as percentages or in Gini points). As we have the top
1% variable only for a subset, we present the results for the Gini estimated with
the full sample and with that subset. As stated before, the time coverage for the
subset for which top 1% information is available is also more consistent across
countries.10
The results, presented in Table 2, consistently suggest a statistically significant
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negative association between median income growth and change in the Gini in the
same period. We see in column (1) that this holds across the entire sample and in
column (2) that it also holds for the subset of countries for which the top 1% share is
available. By contrast, the contemporaneous change in the top 1%’s income share is
not statistically significant when it is the inequality measure included in the model
instead of the Gini coefficient (column 3). The adjusted R2 for these equations is
low, consistent with the low correlation we already noted between median income
growth and change in inequality. The estimated size for the Gini coefficient in
column (6) implies that an average annual increase of 1 Gini point is associated
with a decrease in the compound annual growth rate of 0.6% in median household
income.
Table 2: Estimates of regression model for change in median household income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini, full Gini, top Gini and GNI, Top 1% Gini, top
sample 1% sample Top 1% full sample and GNI 1% and GNI
Gini -1.087* -0.796* -1.052** -0.575*
(0.054) (0.059) (0.034) (0.058)
Top 1% 0.872 -0.453 -0.269
(0.134) (0.382) (0.556)
GNI 0.721*** 0.601*** 0.556***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P50 (level) -0.002 -0.885*** -0.965***
(x 104) (0.996) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 1.340*** 1.354*** 1.153*** 0.05 2.095*** 2.389***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.943) (0.000) (0.000)
N 261 151 151 261 151 151
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.026 0.017 0.406 0.293 0.304
Note: Dependent variable: average annual change in equivalised disposable household income (%).
Independent variables: average annual changes in Gini (Gini points), top 1% (ppt), and GNI per
capita (%), and the level of median equivalised disposable household income (in 2011 PPP-adjusted
dollars). OLS with standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance levels are noted as
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: LIS, OECD and WID.
We elaborate the model in several directions. First, we add the level of median
household income at the beginning of the period as a right-hand-side variable (from
column 4 onwards), as convergence in median incomes, whereby countries with
initially lower incomes tend to grow comparatively quickly and catch up, might
complicate the relationship between change in median incomes and in inequality
(Barro, 2000). Secondly, one would expect growth in national output to be a key
determinant of median income growth, alongside what happens to the distribu-
tion. Moreover, some of the causal stories embedded in the competing narratives
whereby inequality may help or hinder median income growth operate via their
postulated effects on national income. We do not seek to add to the literature on
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the inequality-growth relationship (Barro, 2000; Voitchovsky, 2005), but simply to
investigate what happens to our estimated models when change in gross national
income (GNI) per capita in the same period is added as an explanatory variable.
When the lagged value of the median and the contemporaneous change in GNI per
capita are added to the model, in column (4) of Table 2, the coefficient on change
in overall inequality remains significant and negative, and this is also the case for
the sub-set of countries. Change in GNI per capita is positively associated with
median income growth, and its inclusion improves the explanatory power of the
model substantially. With an estimated coefficient (elasticity) of about 0.6-0.7, in-
creases in GNI per capita tend to be substantially though not fully transmitted to
middle-income households. Substituting change in the top 1%’s income share for
the change in Gini for the sub-set of countries for which it is available, column (5)
shows that this is not statistically significant (though the coefficient is now nega-
tive).
We also estimated an additional set of models to assess the sensitivity of these
results. These are shown in Table 3. Column (1) repeats the final model from Table
(2) for ease of comparison. Column (2) uses measures of median income and in-
come inequality for the working-age population only, rather than the values for the
entire population, since patterns for “ordinary working families” are of particular
salience in current debates. In testing alternative lag structures, we are severely
limited by the number of time periods covered in the data on overall inequality,
but the availability of annual data for the top 1% share means that including the
value for the previous rather than current year can be tested in column (3), and that
for two years previously in column (4). Finally, since the period of the Great Re-
cession from 2008 onwards might be distinctive, in column (5) we re-estimate the
main model for pre-2008 observations only. In all of these variants, the estimated
coefficient on the change in the Gini coefficient is little changed, while that on the
change in the top 1% share remains insignificant.
The models presented so far focus on associations between median income,
measures of income inequality, and economic growth, without controlling for other
potentially relevant features of the economy and time-period in question. Table
4 looks whether these associations change when a variety of control variables are
included. In column (2), we include demographic controls, namely education (the
change in average years of schooling for the population aged 25 and above, linearly
interpolated from the series produced by Barro & Lee, 2017) and the dependency
ratio (average annual difference in the ratio of the population aged under 15 and
over 64 to those aged 15-64 from OECD data). In column (3) we include imports
(average annual percentage point change in international import in goods and ser-
vices as a % GDP from OECD data). Column 4 has a variable for technological
change as also used in OECD (2011), namely the CAGR in patents per million
capita, with total patent applications to both the European Patent Office and the
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Table 3: Estimates of regression model for change in median household income, alternative
formulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Main Working Before
results age Top 1% Top 1% 2008 only
lag 1 lag 2
Gini -0.575* -0.639*** -0.596** -0.529* -0.654**
(0.058) (0.008) (0.044) (0.074) (0.019)
Top 1% -0.269 -0.091 0.215 0.479 -0.148
(0.556) (0.838) (0.576) (0.217) (0.797)
GNI 0.556*** 0.540*** 0.538*** 0.540*** 0.724***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P50 (level) -0.965*** -0.639*** -0.921*** -0.806** -1.009***
(x 104) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.015) (0.005)
Constant 2.389*** 2.892*** 2.264*** 1.991*** 1.949***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.010)
N 151 151 160 167 114
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.323 0.33 0.325 0.395
Note: Dependent variable: average annual change in equivalised disposable
household income (%). Independent variables: average annual changes in Gini
(Gini points), top 1% (ppt), and GNI per capita (%), and the level of median
equivalised disposable household income (in 2011 PPP-adjusted dollars). OLS
with standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance levels are noted
as * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: LIS, OECD and WID.
United States Patent and Trademark Office.
The results in Table 4 show that when education and the dependency ratio (col-
umn 2), imports as a percentage of GDP (column 3) and patents as an indicator of
innovation and technical change (column 4) are included in the model separately,
or when they are all included in combination (column 5), the key features of the
coefficients in the main model are not affected. The same applies when, as a fi-
nal sensitivity check, country fixed effects are added to the main model in place of
these additional controls in column (6). Again, the estimated coefficient of income
inequality does not change much.
Even when income inequality, economic growth and this range of additional
variables are included in the estimated model, a significant part of the variation
in median household income growth over time and across countries is left unex-
plained (see Nolan et al., 2018 for a detailed study on the divergence between
economic growth and median income). This is partly due to the fact that not all the
increase in national income goes to households in the first place (Piketty & Zuc-
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Table 4: Regression model for change in median household income with additional control
variables or country fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Main With education With With With all Country
model dependency ratio imports patents controls fixed effects
Gini -0.575* -0.627** -0.580* -0.578* -0.633** -0.588*
(0.058) (0.041) (0.072) (0.058) (0.050) (0.067)
Top 1% -0.269 -0.151 -0.258 -0.224 -0.088 -0.16
(0.556) (0.718) (0.580) (0.628) (0.842) (0.735)
GNI 0.556*** 0.480*** 0.608*** 0.592*** 0.561*** 0.484***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P50 (level) -0.965*** -0.804*** -0.915*** -0.993*** -0.784*** -0.769
(x 104) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.178)
% Schooling -0.088 -0.072
(0.626) (0.679)
Dependency -168.059** -171.267**
(0.045) (0.025)
Imports -0.152 -0.13
(0.228) (0.292)
% Patents -0.016 -0.017
(0.125) (0.106)
Constant 2.389*** 2.230*** 2.241*** 2.529*** 2.225*** 2.092*
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.083)
N 151 151 151 151 151 151
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.318 0.31 0.307 0.326 0.285
Note: Dependent variable: average annual change in equivalised disposable household income (%).
Independent variables: average annual changes in Gini (Gini points), top 1% (ppt), and GNI per capita (%),
average years of schooling (%), dependency ratio (ppt), imports as % GDP (ppt), patents per million (%),
and the level of median equivalised disposable household income (in 2011 PPP-adjusted dollars). OLS
with standard errors clustered at the country level. Column (6) includes country fixed effects. Significance
levels are noted as * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: LIS, OECD, WID, Barro & Lee.
man, 2014). Some of the economic growth measured through the national accounts
accrues to other sectors, and even the proportion going to the household sector in
national accounts terms will not be fully reflected in the incomes of households
as captured in household surveys. The differences arise for both conceptual and
measurement reasons: who and what is included differs, and some components of
income are underreported in household income surveys (Tormalehto, 2011). Mak-
ing the analytical links in the chain going from overall economic growth to growth
benefitting households is thus an important complement to understanding how the
income that does reach households is distributed among them. It is encouraging
that the OECD is coordinating a project to produce data on incomes reaching the
household sector compatible with the framework of the national accounts (Fesseau
et al., 2013). Another difference is that economic growth is measured on a per
capita basis, whereas our real income levels are calculated at the household level
and equivalised to account for economies of scale within households.
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7 Conclusions
The evolution of ordinary households’ living standards has become a central con-
cern as rich countries strive for inclusive growth and shared prosperity. By analysing
the best available comparative data, this paper has brought out the widely varying
experiences of OECD countries with respect to real income growth around the mid-
dle over the last two or three decades. Median household income growth has been
much faster in some countries than others – 2% or more per year at the high end,
compared to less than 0.5% in the United States. Over a twenty- to thirty-year pe-
riod this yields very striking differences in how middle-income households have
fared. The data also show that for most countries median income growth also var-
ied a good deal from one sub-period to another. An increase in overall inequality –
as reflected in the Gini coefficient – has been the most common experience among
the OECD countries over the same decades, but there has been wide variation in
the extent and timing of that increase, and some countries have seen little or none.
Among the subset of OECD countries for which estimates of top income shares
are available, all have seen increasing concentration of (pretax) income at the top,
but the scale of that increase varies widely and is not always consistent with mea-
sured trends in overall inequality. So here too it is important not to lose sight of
differences in the search for a common, consistent pattern and overarching story.
Furthermore, available estimates of changes in inequality are subject to error, and
different sources and indicators do not always tell the same story, so caution is re-
quired in using these data, not least in studying their relationship with household
income growth.
The comparative time-series data employed here do not allow for an inves-
tigation of the complex channels and processes through which inequality levels
and changes might influence middle income growth, but they do show that there
have been widely varying experiences in how median incomes and inequality have
evolved together. There are countries and sub-periods where inequality rose rapidly
and the median income stagnated, but also ones where rapid median income growth
accompanied increasing inequality and others where inequality was stable while the
median rose only modestly. The US case, with rapidly rising inequality accompa-
nied by stagnating middle incomes, is not representative of the experience of the
rich countries over recent decades.
A negative and statistically significant association between the change in the
Gini coefficient and median income growth was found when we pooled the data
across countries and sub-periods, but this accounted for only a small portion of the
variation in median income growth. Including economic (GNI per capita) growth
and a set of related variables in the statistical model increases its explanatory power,
and the negative relationship between changes in inequality and median income
growth remains. Yet once again a substantial part of the variation in income change
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for the middle remains unaccounted for.
Our findings can only be suggestive, but they do imply that neither of the po-
lar grand narratives featuring so strongly in current debates – that high or rising
inequality consistently boosts or reduces real income growth for the middle – re-
flects the variety of experiences actually observed across the rich countries in recent
decades.
Finally, these findings have implications for how one measures and monitors
progress toward improving living standards for ordinary households. Promoting
and tracking economic growth clearly will not suffice, as is now widely recog-
nised. The evidence presented here shows that monitoring the evolution of in-
come inequality alongside economic growth will also fall short. If incomes around
the middle (or toward the bottom) of the distribution are of central interest, these
must be measured directly and integrated into headline indicators and policy impact
tracking processes.
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Notes
1Note though that national data for a sub-set of countries going back further has been valuably brought together
in the Chartbook of Economic Inequality, see Atkinson et al. (2017).
2These are New Zealand and Portugal, which are not included in LIS; Japan, for which LIS only has data for
only 1 year; Sweden, for which LIS has data only up to 2005; the Netherlands, for which the early waves in LIS
are drawn from a different source to later ones, giving rise to what looks like a major break in the time-series;
Greece, where LIS only starts in 1995 whereas OECD data goes back to 1986; Canada, for which LIS only goes
up to 2010 whereas the OECD database allows 2013 to be included; and South Korea, for which both data sources
start only in 2006 but OECD goes up to 2014 whereas LIS has data only to 2012. For Belgium, LIS runs only
up to 2000 and OECD from 2004-2013, so we link those two series to provides estimates that are necessarily
tentative but allow us to include it in our analysis. In our preferred empirical specification, Belgium drops out as
no data on top incomes are available.
3We have dropped a small number of observations where breaks in series have given rise to substantial changes
in definitions or coverage, based on information provided about the underlying data sources and patterns in the
data, namely Austria 1987 and 1995, Germany 1981, 1983, Netherlands 1983, 1987, 1990 and Switzerland 1982,
1992. We also do not use Israel 1979 or Poland 1986 because comparable PPP information is not available.
4This is the sample shown in Table 1 for which we have top 1% income data (above the horizontal line). We
exclude Portugal, as we only have data on top incomes for 2004-2005. All our results are replicated when we also
exclude South Korea and Switzerland for which the data cover a somewhat shorter time span.
5In using data from LIS we set negative disposable household incomes to zero but retain all households with
zero disposable income, rather than dropping negatives or zero incomes as is sometimes the practice, and we do
not apply top and bottom coding. For the OECD database it is not always clear whether top and bottom coding has
been applied or how negative incomes have been treated, as noted in the OECD’s quality review on the database.
6Households at different income levels may not be affected by price changes in the same way, as shown for
example by Flower and Wales (2014) for the UK, but the absence of comparable data means we cannot take this
into account.
7Among alternative summary inequality measures, the P90/P10 ratio is also available in the OECD database,
so we derived it from LIS micro data as well, and it shows similar patterns to those we describe.
8Estimates on a post-tax basis have been produced in separate studies for a few countries.
9Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Alternative estimation approaches such as system-GMM
are problematic given the limited number of time periods per country
10See Table 1. Portugal is excluded from these regressions because only two years of data are available.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Evolution of living standards of the middle: Real median household income from
around 1985 or later (in 2011 PPP-adjusted dollars)
Note: LIS & OECD
Figure A2: Long-term trends in top income shares from around 1985 or later
Note: WID
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Figure A3: Long-term trends in the Gini coefficient from around 1985 or later
Note: LIS & OECD
